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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, , 
v. 
JAMES REDD AND JEANNE REDD, 
Defendants/Appellees. ] 
i Case No. 970275-CA 
Priority No. 2 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
INTRODUCTION 
The State asks this Court to address the issue of judicial 
notice of an alleged legislative fact, not raised at trial, not 
raised in the appellate briefs, not argued before this Court, but 
raised, for the first time, in their Petition for Rehearing. 
Specifically, the State urges this Court, which it labels as too 
urban to understand, "to recognize that the archaeologist used the 
term of art, "midden," in a particular way when he testified where 
he found the human remains•" (State's Petition, p. 5.) 
The State, in unequivocal violation of Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Rule 24(11), appends approximately 25 pages of excerpts 
of diverse articles about such unknown places as Alkali Ridge amd 
Pecos, in an attempt to buttress its new argument that this Court 
should use judicial notice, of a term of art, used in a particular 
way, to reverse a finding of the Trial Court and to reverse this 
Court's own finding that "... we otherwise conclude that this type 
of fact is not one normally subject to judicial notice ..." State 
v. Redd, 337 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 8, Addendum A of the State's 
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Petition. 
The State, as it did in its briefing, makes factual statements 
not supported by the record. 
The State disagrees with this Court as to the sole issue for 
review. 
In violation of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11, 
and without any attempt under Utah R. App. P. Rule 11(h) to correct 
or modify the record, the State attempts to argue outside the 
record through the use of excerpts from am unofficial transcript 
of the oral argument. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASK 
The Statement of the Case is set forth accurately by this 
Court in its unanimous opinion, affirming the ruling of the Trial 
Court, attached as Addendum A to the State's Petition for 
Rehearing, State v. Redd, 337 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah App. 1998), 
pages 4-5. As stated by the Court, Redd, supra, p. 5, the sole 
issue for review is whether the lower court erred when it dismissed 
at the preliminary hearing the charges against the Redds for abuse 
or desecration of a dead human body. The sole issue for this 
Court, now, is whether the State has met its burden, under Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 35, in convincing this Court that 
this newly raised issue, premised upon openly illegal addenda, was 
so overlooked or misapprehended, that this Court should reverse its 
unanimous ruling and, in turn, based upon this newly raised issue, 
reverse the Trial Court. 
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ARGUMENT 
This Court should not reverse the Trial Court said its own 
unanimous decision on the basis of an issue of alleged legislative 
fact, raised, for the first time, in a Petition for Rehearing. 
Contrary to the State's urging, ex post facto, the particular way 
an archaeologist used a term of art, when he testified, is not 
legislative fact. 
The State opens its argument with the statement that this 
Court affirmed the dismissal "because the State did not put on 
proof of the meaning of the term 'midden1 as used by the 
archaeologist to describe the proximate location of the human bones 
in the Anasazi archaeological site." (Petition, p. 3.) Factually, 
the State's expert witness was never asked and never testified that 
these were Anasazi ruins. The appellate record, page 100, lines 
17-23 show the site description. 
A. We - went to a site that's relatively typical 
of that lower end of Cottonwood Wash. The site 
itself consisted of a building that was about 
30 feet across and sort of a north-to-south 
access with a courtyard in front and a kiva 
to the south, and east of that, a midden area 
and there was a large rectangular hole that 
had been - been dug into that midden, and the 
resulting back dirt from that excavation was 
piled in the immediate vicinity of the - if 
the hole. 
The State's own Petition, page 11, footnote 4, informs us 
that: 
Although less than 20% of San Juan County has 
been inventoried, some 14,736 archaeological 
sites have been identified and entered into an 
electronic data base. Of the sites in the data 
base, 59.2% are identified as Anasazi or Pueblo. 
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Simple math shows that over 6,000 ruins in the electronic data base 
in San Juan County are other than Anasazi - whether paleo, archaic, 
basket-maker, or historical, is unknown from the State's 
statistics. Just as this Court found that "(T)he State called no 
witnesses, expert or otherwise, to establish that these bones were 
intentionally deposited in the earth in a place of repose," neither 
did the State's expert label this ruin an Anasazi or Pueblo, or 
paleo, archaic, basket-maker, or historical. Redd, supra, p. 7. 
The State cannot, by mere argument, on a Petition for 
Rehearing, supply testimony that was not given. 
The next sub-argument by the State is an admission that not 
only was this Court correct in having found that the State had not 
sought judicial notice in the lower Court, but that the State, in 
oral argument, when the issue of judicial notice was raised, failed 
to mention either Utah Rules of Evidence 201 or this new issue of 
an alleged legislative fact. In State v. Montova, 937 P.2d 145 
(Utah App. 1997), the Court, page 149, quoting Limb v. Federated 
Milk Producer's Ass'n., 461 P.2d 290 (Utah 1969), at 293 n. 2, held 
that "(T)he appellate court will affirm a judgment on grounds not 
urged below, but will not reverse the lower court on errors claimed 
for the first time on appeal." 
There is a due process component which is violated by this 
twelfth hour newly raised issue. To allow the State to selectively 
focus on an issue it raised for the first time after the unanimous 
appellate opinion is issued, while illegally appending a hodge 
podge of excerpts which relate to areas other than this "site 
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that's relatively typical of that lower end of Cottonwood Wash" 
(R. 100, lines 17-18), is to give the defendants, originally 
charged with a serious felony, no notice nor opportunity to fairly 
respond, in view of the constraints of Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure 24(11). The cliche about two wrongs not making one right 
is apposite here. The State's illegal efforts to modify the 
record, without a Utah R. App. P., Rule 11(h) motion, is 
understandable in the face of clear law that such a motion cannot 
be used to introduce new material in the record. Olson v. Park-
Craicr-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah App. 1991). However, the 
defendants cannot, without joining the State's illegalities, append 
articles showing that, even assuming this were to have been an 
Anasazi area, which was not shown by the State, Pueblo II Anasazi 
burials included burial pits and period pottery, that skulls and 
bones were thrown into pits with other debris to level up the 
depression before Pueblo II walls were built, that extensive 
articles exist on Anasazi cannibalism with commensurate scattering 
or mass dumping of remains, that toward the sunset of the Anasazi, 
bodies were left or scattered, and that, in the case of the museum 
in Blanding, a body was found in one of the dwellings. In short, 
the discipline of archaeology, like most, is not at all unanimous 
regarding the place of intentional burials or that bones in middens 
necessarily equate an intentional burial, without additional data. 
Contrary to the State's position, the use of the word midden 
does not describe a burial ground. The Court, at footnote 2 of its 
opinion, Redd, supra, p. 7, finds "a midden area to be an area 
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where refuse or garbage is piled." Merriam Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary, Tenth Edition, the book we send to college with our 
youth, at page 736, defines "midden" first as "dunghill" and second 
as "a refuse heap; esp: kitchen midden." Lastly, a third 
definition is given as "a small pile (as of seeds, bones, or 
leaves) gathered by a rodent (as a pack rat)" emphasis added. 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, at page 
1429, is a bit more expansive but in line with this Court's 
observations. Again, "midden" is first listed as "dunghill," then 
"an accumulation of refuse about a dwelling place; a refuse heap, 
kitchen midden, one of the masses of highly organic soil deposited 
by an earthworm about its burrow; sometime organic debris left on 
the soil by various other animals." 
The State argues, inaccurately, at footnote 2, page 8, 
"(r)egardless of the pending controversy, the definition of the 
archaeological term of art "midden" will remain constant." It 
bases its argument on a fact not presented by their expert, that 
this was an Anasazi ruin. 
The very definition of legislative facts involves a 
universality of understanding. Legislative facts "do not relate 
specifically to the activities or characteristics of the litigants. 
A Court generally relies upon legislative facts when it purports 
to develop a particular law or policy and thus considers material 
wholly unrelated to the activities of the parties." U.S. v. Gould. 
536 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1976), at 220. By its very argument, the 
State defeats its position. "In the context of the case before the 
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Court, the recognition of the word "midden" within the Anasazi 
culture as a usual burial place for Anasazi dead is a legislative 
fact." (Petition, p. 8.) Yet "this Court, sitting in urban Salt 
Lake City," does not understand "the full meaning of the term ..." 
(Petition, p. 10.) 
The State has the burden of thoroughly briefing an issue 
because the "reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly 
defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research." Montova, supra, page 150, quoting from 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted); 
accord Burns v. Summerhaup, 929 P.2d 197 (Utah App. 1996) and State 
v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599 (Utah App. 1992), for the fact that "this 
court has routinely declined to consider arguments which are not 
adequately briefed on appeal•" 
Applying these principles, the Montova Court declined to 
address the State's new arguments and, the defendants urge, this 
Court should decline to address the State's new argument in the 
instant case. 
Nowhere does the State provide any legal authority that the 
definition of a term of art, used in a particular testimony, 
qualifies as legislative fact. The State argues that a midden 
should not be understood in the normal meaning, but rather "in the 
context of the case before the Court," it was a "term of art" that 
these three eminent "urban" jurists did not understand, and that, 
despite a failure of the State to have their expert testify that 
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this was an Anasazi site, the illegal appended articles, about 
undefined or unrelated areas, supports their assertion that the 
word "midden" is a usual burial place for Anasazi dead. The very 
stating of the special circumstances in their argument defeats the 
argument• 
The State's summary statement, that "sufficient evidence of 
intentional interment was presented through the archaeologist's 
testimony to support a bindover for trial in district court," 
(Petition, p. 12) refutes the exact unanimous findings of this 
Court. "The State called no witnesses, expert or otherwise, to 
establish that these bones were intentionally deposited in the 
earth in a place of repose." This Court unanimously found that 
"(T)he sole fact that bones are underground when found does not 
raise a reasonable inference that the bones were intentionally 
deposited in the earth for the purpose of placing them in repose." 
Redd, supra, p. 7. It is this Court's findings that reflect a 
universality and common sense understanding of a host of possible 
explanations for the presence of disparate bone fragments, in the 
ground, some of which were listed in defendants' brief and in this 
response• 
The State has cast its lot in this completely newly raised 
argument with the testimony of ics archaeologist. (Petition p. 
12.) Mr. Davidson's testimony is in the record from page 99-104. 
The word Anasazi never appears. Never does the witness use the 
word burial or grave. Never does the witness describe particular 
types of pottery shards found so as to date these fragments. Never 
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does the witness talk about artifacts consistent with an 
intentional interment. The weight of the State's argument, they 
admit, hangs on the use by the expert witness of the word "midden" 
twice within one sentence on page 100, for he does not otherwise 
use it in five pages of testimony. The witness never is asked and 
never volunteers, or even hints at, some hidden, pregnant, word-
of-art, definition. Yet from this one sentence, from these two 
words, with nothing more, the State asks this Court to ignore the 
common definition and supplant it with that supplied, not by law, 
but with illegally attached addenda. 
The State cites no Utah Appellate Rules of Procedure but 
violates them. 
The State cites five cases at law. The sole federal case is 
U. S. v. Coffman, 638 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1980) . Coffman affirmed 
the lower court. Coffman, at 195, cites U.S. v. Gould, supra, 219-
221, in saying that "Legislative facts are established truths, 
facts, or pronouncements that do not change from case to case but 
apply universally ..." Here the State seeks not a universal 
application of the meaning of midden but rather one restricted to 
this particular case, the particular way it was used by a 
particular witness, as a "term-of -art.w 
The State cites Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 
P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996) . Cruz affirmed the lower court. The State's 
citation is to a footnote in a concurring opinion, and references 
to "the propriety of considering legislative facts in making policy 
decisions." "Stated another way, legislative facts are used to 
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craft general rules of law, while adjudicative facts are used only 
to decide the particular case on trial and not for a more general 
purpose." Cruz, supra, 1259 n. 1. In Cruz, the statistics were 
cited in plaintiff's brief and were argued to the court/ unlike the 
instant case. In the instant case, contrary to the now cited law, 
the State does not seek a universal application and does not seek 
that this Court make a policy decision, but rather, by its own 
words, relegates its request to that this Court "recognize that the 
archaeologist used the term-of-art "midden" in a particular way 
when he testified where he found the human remains." (Petition, 
p. 5.) It focuses the Court "in the context of the case before the 
Court." (Petition p. 8.) This Court's unanimous findings and the 
common meaning of midden defy application of Cruz and legislative 
facts to the instant case such as to support a reversal. 
The State quotes this Court's findings in Redd, and seeks, by 
a new theory, to reverse this Court and the Trial Court/ but gives 
no case wherein judicial notice of legislative fact permitted 
reversal. 
The State cites Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 
Inc., 758 P.2d 451 (Utah App. 1988) but shrugs it aside, "because 
the Court is not being asked to take judicial notice of an 
adjudicative fact." (Petition, p. 5.) However, Trimble has 
several holdings quite germane. The first is that "Utah courts 
have consistently followed a policy strongly opposed to the raising 
of issues for the first time on appeal." Trimble, supra 456, 
citing Zion First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 
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P.2d 651 (Utah 1988) for the principle that this rule applies even 
when facts are not disputed and the issue raised is one of law. 
Trimble also, on page 456, footnote 4, points out that taking 
notice for the first time on appeal is permissive if it is for 
affirmance, but not reversal, as is here sought by the State. 
Finally, the State cites State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 
1986), a case which reversed a conviction for admission of 
unauthenticated documents and is the seminal Utah case on requiring 
cautionary instruction in single eye-witness cases. It adds 
nothing to the issue of so late a raising of legislative fact being 
the basis for a reversal. 
Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure mandates that 
the "petition shall state with particularity the points of law or 
fact which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked or 
misapprehended." Implicit in this common understanding of 
"overlooked or misapprehended" is that the issue was raised at some 
level. But it was not. This Court overlooked nothing. The claim 
that this "urban" Court did not understand the particular way a 
term-of-art was used by a particular witness in the particular case 
defies any meaning or understanding of legislative fact with its 
mandated universal application. The State cites no law which 
permits a newly raised judicial notice, adjudicative or 
legislative, to be used to reverse the Trial Court or this Court. 
The State cannot violate the Rules by illegally appending material; 
cannot create evidence or inference from a vacuum; cannot by simply 
saying Anasazi, attach it to their witness's testimony; cannot show 
12 
over 6,000 San Juan Sites to not be Anasazi and fail to distinguish 
this site, and cannot violate the defendants1 rights to due process 
by so lately raising this issue, with no opportunity to refute 
addenda without themselves violating Utah Appellate Rules of 
Procedure. 
The State has failed, completely, in its burden under Rule 35 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DIXON AND SNOW, P.C. 
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